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I
Suppose a manufacturer whose goods are neither patented nor
subject to any copyright and are in competition with similar goods
of other manufacturers and not the subject of any public necessity,
and who does not occupy any preponderant position in the business
in which he is thus engaged, sells his commodity to retail distributors
with the covenant by them not to sell, and that the goods are not
to be sold by anyone, for less than certain prices. If such a contract
is valid, is it enforcible between the parties by injunction? If so,
is it enforcible specifically in equity against third parties who take
with notice of the restrictive covenant? These are important
questions, but they are subordinate to the settlement of the validity
of the contract as between the parties.
Before the decision in the United States Supreme Court of the
Dr. Miles Medical Co. casela it had been held in England and in
several states of the Union-that is to say in a number of common
law jurisdictions where the question arose-that such a contract
was valid, as between the parties so that damages for the breach
might be recovered,2 or an injunction against the breach obtained. 3
In one case at least the injunction was allowed against third parties
who had notice of the contract, and who had procured an original
party to the contract to purchase and resell to the defendant so that
4
the defendant might sell for a lower price than that specified.
Recently, however, in the Dr. Miles Medical case' the United States
1

0f the Chicago Bar.
IaDr. Miles Medical Co. v. Park & Sons Co., 220 U. S. 373 (I91).
2
Elliman, Sons & Co. v. Carrington & Son, L. R. [I9OI] 2 Ch. 275; Garst v.
Harris,
I77 Mass. 72 (1900).
3
Grogan v. Chaffee, 156 Cal. 611 (i9o9); Garst v. Charles, 187 Mass. 144
(19o5). See also Clark v. Frank, 17 Mo. App. 602 (1885); New York Ice Co.
v. Parker, 2I How. Prac. (N. Y.) 302 (1861).
'Garst v. Charles, supra, note 3.
5
Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. Park & Sons Co., supra, note ia.
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Supreme Court has held that no injunction should issue against
the third party who took the commodity with notice of the restrictive
agreement. It made no difference that the bill alleged, and the
demurrer admitted that the defendant sought to sell the complainant's goods to others who might sell them at cut rates and "thus attract
and secure custom and patronage for other merchandise, and not
for the purpose of making or receiving a direct money profit," and
for this purpose procured the commodities from the complainant's
"wholesale and retail agents" by "false and fraudulent representations and statements, and by surreptitious and dishonest methods,
and by persuading and inducing directly and indirectly" a violation
of their contract. It should also be noted that the decision of the
United States Supreme Court did not go on the ground that equity
would not give specific performance of a restrictive covenant relating
to the disposal of personal property, or that specific performance in
general could not be given against a third party who took property
with notice of the restriction. The court went solely on the ground
that the agreement was illegal between the parties and not enforcible
in any kind of an action.
This sharp division of opinion between the United States Supreme
Court and the courts of other jurisdictions justifies an examination
of the merits of the opposing contentions.
The United States Supreme Court first makes the point that the
seller cannot control the passing of title to future purchasers by
requiring that title shall pass only at certain prices. Such an attempt,
if successful, would, it insists, impose an illegal restraint or forfeiture
upon alienation. If this be a sound principle and applicable it
would be no answer to it that there is no restriction upon the passing
of title, but only a contract as to the price which the purchaser may
ask upon a resale. If such an agreement is enforced specifically in
equity between the parties and against third parties with notice,
there is produced the effect of a restraint on the alienation of the
commodity itself. If an attempt to do the latter is illegal, certainly
equity would not permit the former. If damages may be collected
for the breach of the attempted contract in question there is to a
less degree only, a deterrent to alienation. Ignoring, however, the
decisive effect of the rule forbidding restraints on alienation, the
Supreme Court considers the validity of the arrangement merely
as an agreement between the parties. This agreement it finds is
illegal because it is one of a scheme of contracts with many retailers
which operates as an arrangement between all the retailers to eliminate competition between themselves, and to fix the price at which
they will sell a given commodity. This, it is said, is as objectionable
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as if the dealers themselves had combined and agreed upon prices
gener4lly.
All this is a faithful adherence to the outward form of certain rules
without, it is believed, any regard for their actual meaning.
We have, for instance, a faithful adherence to the form of the rule
that restraints and forfeitures upon alienation of absolute interests
in personal property are illegal. It is entirely overlooked that this
expressed a rule of public policy, and is properly qualified whenever
the courts have to deal with a distinctive transaction which does not
infringe the policy which the rule carries out. Thus one may provide
for forfeiture upon alienation to a particular person or group of
persons.6 Some cases have even gone so far as to permit a forfeiture
on alienation to any one except a certain group of persons.7 The
question always is, has the restraint or forfeiture on alienation been
restricted in so distinctive a way that the public policy behind the
rule has not been infringed? Perhaps it would be better to say that
upon a balance of all considerations the freedom of action of the party
restricting alienation to some extent outweighed the dangers to the
public from the limitation on alienation. The moment the case in
question is approached in this way, what do we find? The manufacturer is in the business of selling products to the public. He cannot
prosper unless sales are made. His goods are in competition with
goods of other manufacturers who are as strong commercially as he is.
These are distinctive features which the courts can lay hold of.
They automatically require a price at which the manufacturer's
goods will sell. This means that any restraint or forfeiture on
alienation is reduced to the minimum. It means that there is a
restraint or forfeiture on alienation to the class of people who will
buy only at the reduced price which dealers not subject to the contract
might make. The distinctive feature of the transaction makes it
clear that this will be a small group in comparison with those who
are ready to buy at the established price. Properly analyzed the
restraint or forfeiture on alienation whether it proceeds from an
expressed forfeiture of the title on alienation or a restraint on its
alienation below a certain price, or from the specific enforcement
of the contract in equity, is reduced to such a point as to exclude
it from the infringement of any public policy against general provisions of forfeiture or restraints on alienation of personal property.
When we add the special grounds for freedom of economic action
6

Littleton, 361.

Doe v. Pearson, 6 East (Eng.) 173 (1805); In re Macleay, L. R. 2o Eq. 186
(1875). Contra, Attwater v. Attwater, 18 Beav. (Eng.) 330 (1853). And see
In re Rosher, 26 Ch. Div. 8ox (1884).
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in transactions having the distinctive features of this one, the validity
of the arrangement in question should not be in doubt.
The manufacturer of a "specialty" or of "branded goods" succeeds
commercially by doing a large part of the selling himself. He packs
his own goods. He standardizes 'them. He advertises them in
competition with similar goods of other equally strong manufacturers.
The only thing he does not do is to distribute them. He cannot succeed if he attempts to do that. These goods are of the sort that the
purchaser comes to know and to call for wherever he is, and he pays
for them, very largely, over the counter of the distributor. The
manufacturer, therefore, needs a large number of convenient distributing points. He needs all the groceries in the United States or
all the pharmacies. These are not really purchasers of goods for
sale. They are distributors of goods for the manufacturer- the
manufacturer having by his advertising, standardizing and packing,
done a large part of the business of selling. Now comes the prime
difficulty with this system of selling. Grocers in small groups all
over the United States compete with each other. So do the owners
of pharmacies in small groups. The smaller retailer is in competition
with the better organized department store. The moment that
the retailers are permitted to compete with each other as to the price
of "specially" or "branded" goods, the manufacturer's distributing
plan, which is vital to his success is impaired. If his goods are very
popular some retailer or department store will advertise a cut rate
below cost in order to attract customers to whom other goods will be
sold at a compensatory profit. Such a course disrupts the manufacturer's distributing units. Others who cannot or will not meet
the cut cease to be interested in carrying or pushing the manufacturer's goods. This arrangement tends to exist everywhere
because some unit will always be in a state of cutting prices on a
popular branded article in order to stimulate general trade for the
unit.
This is the condition which the manufacturer seeks to meet by
his contract to stabilize prices upon resale. That such contracts
are necessary to this method of doing business is plain; that the
method of doing business itself has some advantages to the public
is equally clear. It centralizes advertising, and, therefore, saves
greatly on this item. It centralizes the labor of packing, which saves
also on the cost of the article. It standardizes articles so that
the time spent at the counter in determining what to buy is cut
down, and in this way the selling cost is reduced. It is efficient
in service because of the large number of convenient distributing
points which are used. To tell the manufacturer that he cannot
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work out the marketing end of his business by the method in question
is to tell him that he cannot distribute most efficiently through a
large number of retailers without suffering the consequences of their
tendency to compete with each other. This is to condemn a new
method of conducting business to inefficiency and waste, or to
disrupt it entirely. Such a course neglects the fact that, while
title technically passes to the retailer, the manufacturer is in reality,
to a considerable degree, the seller by reason of his having done a
large and expensive part of the work of selling to the ultimate
consumer. It overlooks the fact that he is, in a sense, a partner
with the retailer until the goods have come to the ultimate consumer,
and as such is entitled to control the price in the interest of his method
of distribution.
Economists and students of business may discuss whether the
method of manufacturing and selling "specialty" and "branded"
goods coupled with contracts on the part of the retailer to keep up
the price on resale is a valuable or the wisest method or not. There
may be differences of opinion about the matter. Where, however,
there are opposing advantages and disadvantages in the way the
business is conducted and where it remains a matter of opinion or
speculation whether good or ill to the public preponderates, the
fundamental social interest in the freedom of economic action requires
the courts to refrain from throwing a monkey wrench into the commercial effort in question.
When the court declares the contract to keep up the price on re-sale
is invalid because it is the same as a contract or combination between
all the retailers to eliminate competition between themselves and
fix prices, we again have a faithful adherence to the form of a legal
rule without the slightest regard for its substance or the reasons
which determine its limitations. When retailers who are competing
combine and eliminate competition between themselves by agreements as to prices, we have the recorded assumption that in their
sphere of business, at least, they have a preponderant or monopolistic
position, and that they will keep it by using their power to exclude
others by unfair and illegal methods of competition. 8 The agreement
as to price is the admission of facts which make an illegal attempt
at monopoly. But where the manufacturer sells his "specialty"
or "branded" goods to distributors who agree to keep up the price
on re-sale, we have no such admission or, at least, the inference of
any such admission is rebutted. The manufacturer has no preponderant position in the business. He is in competition with many other
manufacturers who sell goods of the same sort. Nor is the posi8

See A. M. Kales, Good and Bad Trusts, 30 Har. L. Rev. 830, 852.
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tion of the manufacturer preponderant because he deals through a
large number of retailers who agree to keep up the price on re-sale.
These retailers may handle the goods of the competitors of the manufacturer on exactly the same terms or on terms more favorable to the
buyers. The manufacturer by reason of having taken care of the,
advertising, standardizing and packing of the goods and requiring
of the retailer only the function of distributing and receiving payment is in substance a partner with the retailer in selling, and has
a legitimate interest in controlling the price to prevent the disorganization of his distributing system. This does not eliminate any
competition between the manufacturer and other manufacturers
who are doing the same sort of business. There is no exclusion of
others from the manufacturing business or from the -business of
retailing. It is the free competition among the manufacturers which
determines the price to the public. The contract to keep up the
price on re-sale is thus reduced to a device to preserve the most
effective distributing organization for the manufacturer who is also
in part, at least, the actual seller as well.
In Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus9 the Supreme Court held that the
holder of a copyright on a book who had sold it with a restriction
that it was not to be resold for less than $i.oo could not have an
injunction against the violation of the restriction by a third party
who had notice of it. This ruling seems to have proceeded solely
upon a construction of the copyright act, for the jurisdiction of the
court was founded, not on diverse citizenship and the specific performance of a restrictive agreement, but upon the protection afforded
by the Federal statutes against infringement of copyrights. The
copyright act gave the holder of the copyright the "sole right of
vending the same." This was construed to include no right whatever to fix the price at which the copyrighted article might subsequently be sold. In Bauer v. O'Donnell' the same ruling was made
where a patented article was involved. This also proceeded upon
the construction of the patent act which gave the patentee "the
exclusive right to make, use and vend the invention or discovery."
In Straus v. Victor Talking Machine Co." an attempt to retain
title to the patented article in the manufacturer who merely licensed the use subject to a condition and covenant that the article
should not be resold for less than a certain price was equally ineffective and unenforceable. Again an injunction against a third party
who had no contract relations with the plaintiff, but who had notice
of the restriction, was denied.
9210

1243

U.
U. S.S. 339
490 (I9O8).
(1917).

10229 U. S. 1 (1913).
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Suppose in these cases the complainant had abandoned all reliance
upon the copyright or patent act and had treated the articles sold
as the "specialty" product of his manufacture which he desired
to market by securing a covenant requiring the price to be kept up on
re-sale. Suppose the United States court secured jurisdiction on
the basis of diverse citizenship, or suppose the suit were in a state
court and the covenants were of the sort which equity gave specific
performance of by injunction even against third parties with notice.
Would the result have been the same? Clearly it would if the Dr.
Miles Medical case were followed. 12 But suppose the result in that
case had been to enforce the restriction by injunction, would the same
result have been reached in a case where a patented or copyrighted
article was being marketed? Perhaps so and perhaps not. If the
patent were a fundamental one which controlled an entire industry
like the original Bell Telephone patent, a court of equity might say:
"You have a monopoly by the patent or copyright act, but we shall
not aid that monopoly by giving you anything beyond what you are
entitled to by the terms of the statute." On the other hand if the
patent or copyright gave no monopoly in the given business-if the
patented or copyrighted article was in competition with other
articles of the same sort-the patented or copyrighted article should
not be any worse off for that reason. The same relief, therefore,
might be given as in the case of "specialty" or "branded" goods
which are in competition with others of the same sort.
II
The Supreme Court of the United States first held in Henry v.
A. B. Dick Co.' 3 that where the holder of a patented article licensed
its use, the license may be made subject to the condition or stipulation that the licensee would use with the patented article only
unpatented accessories, manufactured and sold by the licensor,
and that upon the violation of this stipulation there would be an
infringement by the user of the patented article. In the recent case
of Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film ManufacturingCo.14
the decision in the Dick case was overruled, and it was held that the
violation of the condition or stipulation does not make the use of
the patented article an infringement. In both cases alike the court
appears to have been obliged to deal with a controversy between the
parties as if it involved the infringement of a patent, for only on that
ground did the United States Court obtain jurisdiction. The Dick
12

Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. Park & Sons Co., supra,note ia.
U. S. I (1912).
'4243 U. S. 502 (1917).
13224
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case proceeded upon the theory that the act relating to patents
permitted the holder of the patent to license the use of the patented
article upon such terms as he saw fit, and if the conditions and stipulations which he imposed were not lived up to, then the license failed
and there was a user without license,-that is to say, an infringement.
This line of reasoning the Motion Picture Patents case denies. It declares that the holder of the patent may license the use of the article
or not, as he pleases, but that the act gives him no authority to license subject to the condition or stipulations in question which
if not adhered to, will cause the user to be an infringement.
The Dick case and the Motion Picture case have to do only with a
construction of the patent act; but behind the decision in the Motion
Picture case is the intimation that the arrangement there attempted
is so far contrary to the public interest that the patent act should
not be construed to permit it. Suppose, then, that instead of seeking
relief for an infringement, the complainants in the Dick case and
the Motion Picture case sought damages for the breach of a contract
on the part of the licensee to use only such accessories with the patented article as were furnished by the licensors. Is it a defense to
such a suit that the contract is illegal?
The reasoning of the court in the Dr. Miles Medical case has
nothing to do with this problem. The result of the Dr. Miles case
went upon the illegality of a restraint or forfeiture on alienation
which was attempted to be imposed, and the fact that there was
in effect a combination of retailers under contract with each other
to fix the price of a commodity. Neither line of reasoning touches
the contract by a purchaser to use only certain accessories with
the article purchased. If such contracts are illegal between the
parties, it must be on some ground not articulated or applied in
the Dr. Miles case. What can it be?
Suppose A has a mule, can he sell him to B subject to the covenant
by B to curry him only with such combs as are furnished by A?
Why not? A does not have to sell. Can he not, as one of the terms
of the selling, require the purchaser to buy something else? What
is the objection to limiting what B must also buy to an article used
in connection with the chattel sold? The courts have not been
troubled with such a case because trading in mules is carried on in
such a way as to make stipulations of the sort suggested impracticable. Such conditions and stipulations can only be exacted where
the article sold is of special and peculiar value-as is more frequently
the case with patented articles. Suppose, then, that A had a valuable
collection of paintings: could he sell each article with the stipulation
that the purchaser should use only such cleaning and preserving
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preparations for the picture as were sold by A? Why not? The
only difference in the cases is that now A is in a strong enough position
in the market to exact the stipulation.
Where A has a patented article the situation is precisely the same.
The patent laws, by giving him the right to prevent anyone else
from making the patented article, place A in the unique position
of being able to control absolutely the sale of an article of special
and peculiar value. He can sell it or not as he pleases. He can
prevent anyone else from selling it. Having such an article, A
bargains for the sale or license of it as he would any other piece of
personal property. Is he, then, debarred from selling it on the best
terms possible? Is he barred from saying, "I will not sell unless
the purchaser buys something else with it which is not patented"?
Is he forbidden to make a bargain that unpatented accessories
which are used in connection with the patented article shall be only
those made and sold by the licensor or holder of the patent? How
can there be any other answers to these questions than an emphatic
negative? When A has goods to sell, is it not in the public interest
that he should get as much for them as possible? Is he not free to
make the best terms possible? If he can require the purchaser to buy
other goods, and thus secure a market for the sale of such other goods,
in competition with other parties, is not that his privilege? Since
when has it been true that this time honored method of trading has
become illegal? If such terms are legal, is it not equally legal for
the purchaser to require that unpatented accessories used with a
patented article sold shall be purchased from the seller? Are the
rights of a patentee in this respect less than the rights of the owner
of a mule or a picture?
If the stipulation in question makes a legal and enforceable contract at law, then the question arises whether equity will give specific
performance of it as between the original parties and as against
third parties who take the patented article with notice. This depends
upon whether the remedy at law, is inadequate. Suppose it is.
Suppose, also, the fact that the restrictive covenant is connected
with the sale or license of a chattel is no objection to the specific
enforcement of the covenant against third parties taking the chattel
with notice.'5 Is there any defense to an action of specific performance that the contract, while not illegal in law, is so far unfair,
unconscionable or contrary to the interests of the public that equity
'5Abergarw Brwg. Co. v. Holmes, L. R. [i9OO] I Ch. 188; Francisco v. Smith,
143 N. Y. 488 (1894); Standard Co. v. Methodist Co., 33 App. Div. (N. Y.) 409
(1898); Murphy v. Christian Press Assn., 38 App. Div. (N. Y.) 426 (1899);
New York Co. v. Hamilton Co., 83 Hun. (N. Y.) 593 (i1895); 28 App. Div. (N. Y.)
411 (1898).
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should not give specific performance? Such a defense might exist,
especially where the contract was supplementary to a combination
occupying a preponderant position in the business, and part of a
system of contracts used for the purpose of compelling others to come
into the combination or be excluded entirely from the business. It is
submitted, however, that no such defense to specific performance
existed in the Dick case or the Motion Picture case.
If, then, the condition or stipulation entered into by the licensee
or purchaser of a patented article, that he will not use the same
except with unpatented accessories furnished by the licensor or
seller is not illegal,-and if it is specifically enforceable in equity as
between the parties and as against third parties taking with notice,what possible objection is there to permitting a construction of the
patent act which would permit the holder of a patent to make a
license or sale of a patented article subject to the condition or stipulation that it be used only in connection with certain unpatented
accessories sold by the licensor, with the result that upon a breach of
the stipulation or condition the continued user of the patented
article would become an infringement? Perhaps this: That so
long as the stipulation is justified under the patent act it confers
an absolute statutory right in equity to obtain specific performance
in the guise of enjoying an infringement. On the other hand, so
long as it is merely a contract of which equity gives specific performance under certain terms and conditions, its enforcement by injunction may be so far limited and controlled that the results will
not be unconscionable as between the parties or contrary to the interests of the public. In short, a stipulation which requires specific
performance as a matter of right might be regarded as contrary
to public policy, when a stipulation which was valid at law between
the parties and the specific performance of which was in the control and discretion of a court of equity, might be regarded as valid.
III
What has been said by way of objection to the Dr. Miles case
and the Motion PicturePatents case has been based upon the assumption that there was no objection to a court of equity giving specific
performance of restrictions as to the use of chattels even against
third parties taking the chattels with notice of the restrictions.
This proposition, however, may be open to question. It is only
recently that courtshavebeen called upon to give specific performance
in such cases. While the justice of so doing in particular instances
may be apparent, the courts must face the fact that they are opening
up a wide field for the creation of what are in effect property interest
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servitudes in chattels. When the covenantee or promisee can say
to the buyer of a chattel, "You cannot use what you have bought
unless you do so in the following manner," or, "You cannot sell it
unless at a certain price," and if this position on the part of the seller
can be enforced specifically against any holder of the chattel taking
with notice, a servitude has been created in the chattel in favor of
the promisee and perhaps in favor of whoever is running the business
of the promisee. It may be that the Dr. Miles case and the Motion
Picture Patents case both indicate a reaction against permitting
the specific performance of restrictions as to chattels against third
parties with notice. Perhaps the undesirable features of having
vast numbers of chattels in commerce subject to all manner of property servitudes has been borne in upon the Supreme Court of the
United States. Perhaps a general dislike for such servitudes may
have been translated by the Court into what appears to the casual
reader of the opinions to be a condemnation of the particular restrictions involved.
The following discriminations are suggested:
i. Stipulations and conditions requiring the buyer of a chattel
to keep up the price on re-sale, or to buy or use other articles in
connection with those sold, are valid between the parties and may
be enforced in suits at law for damages.
2. When the articles sold are patented or copyrighted, the license
to use them cannot be made subject to such conditions and stipulations so that the failure to observe them will give rise to the statutory
action in equity for an infringement.
3. Such restrictive contracts may be specifically enforceable in
equity as between the parties.
4. Whether specific performance will be given to the promisee
against third parties taking the chattel with notice of the restrictions
may be open to debate. Specific performance should not, however,
be refused because the contract is illegal as between the parties.
It should not be refused because there is anything inimical to the
interests of the public in such restrictions as were involved in the
Dr. Miles and Motion Picture Patents cases. It is entirely conceivable, however, that some restrictions might be of such a character
that while they were valid at law or even in equity, as between
the parties, it would be proper, in the interests of the public, to
refuse enforcement of them against third parties, even with notice.
If specific performance against third parties is refused in the case
of restrictions such as were involved in the Dr. Miles and Motion
Picture Patents cases, it should be on the ground that it is against
public policy that any servitudes be created in chattels by the specific
performance in equity of restrictions against third parties with notice.

